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Some markets are prone to develop shadow transactions for the purpose of tax avoidance. 
Moral sentiments control the allocation of consumers between the legal and illicit markets. 
Such sentiments include self-esteem and social disapproval. The market solution leads to 
fiscal externality resulting from tax avoidance and highlights the conflict between private 
opportunism and collective values. Shadow markets may, however, enhance consumer 
welfare by limiting the pricing power of firms and by controlling tax collection. The paper 
develops a model of endogenous segmentation of markets between moral and immoral 
behavior. The legal producer can price the self-esteem of honest people, who can blackmail 
the legal producer with their option of visiting the illicit market. The model has implications 
for monetary economics: moral sentiments, tax rates, illegal transactions, and probability of 
being caught become relevant for the demand for money. 
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 1 Introduction
Shadow economy and illicit economic activities may touch deeply moral feel-
ings of people. The inherited economic literature on shadow markets has,
however, predominantly been focused on two issues, i.e. surveying payment
transactions and providing measures for the size of underground economic
activities.1 It has, however, produced only to a limited extent economic
analyses of the mechanisms involved and welfare implications of such activ-
ities. In particular, as it is not been conventional to link market activities
and moral standards.2 Our paper addresses these issues. It raises the ques-
tion what determines the borderline between legal and shadow economies. It
asks why moral sentiments can control shadow activities only imperfectly. It
therefore introduces preferences for moral standards, determination of moral-
ity as social capital and sustainability of social norms when taxes can be
avoided by visiting illicit markets. It considers the commodity tax in allo-
cating consumers between the legal and illicit sectors and falling only partly
on the owners of the legal ﬁrm. The paper then explores the welfare eﬀects
are associated. It also suggests that illegal transactions are an important
determinant of cash holdings despite the fact that more eﬃcient electronic
payment system are at hand.3
Some markets are prone to develop shadow transactions for the purpose
of tax avoidance especially if the government is viewed as a predatory rev-
enue maximizer. Despite such a view of government, people have intrinsic
moral sentiments, with preference for obeying inherited social norms and
disapproving deviants. People care what other people think of them and
they are subject to self-esteem. In our work, morality is viewed as a net-
1Au s e f u lc l a s s i ﬁcation of this activity is provided by Thomas (1992), subsequently
reviewed by Schneider and Enste (2002). In this paper, we consider illegal economic
activity which includes market transactions but excludes such activities as exchange of
goods and neighborhood help.
2Hausman and McPherson (1993) have provided a review of why and how morality
inﬂuences economic outcomes.
3Using cash for payments of illegal anonymous transactions appears as an important
motive for why people hold cash in spite of the recent innovations in the payment system.
Cash payments are convenient for those who seek to hide their motives. The markets
for prostitution, for example, are presumably predominantly based on the use of cash,
reducing the enforceability of within family contracts. Modern brand products like Nike
or Adidas in sportswear and shoes or Prada on ladies fashion are actively copied and
marketed in pirate products. With high legal prices of CDs, people have developed ability
to copy music freely from internet. In construction, illegal labor is employed with the aim
of tax evasion. Many private services are delivered without receipts. In most economies,
there are also well-functioning secondary markets for stolen durable goods. Moreover, the
rise of terrorism is largely ﬁnanced by illegal money.
2work good. Apart from consumption opportunities, people value the social
approval attached to their behavior within the social network sharing the
same moral values. By implication, deviants subject themselves to the risk
of being detected and becoming socially stigmatized. Detection is, however,
probabilistic and by anonymous transactions immoral people may mimic the
moral ones. Morality operates like a particular form of social capital.4 In
our model, it is determined endogenously as the share of people who choose
to commit to honest behavior.5
A natural way of justifying the moral feelings of social disapproval is to
think that those sentiments can be traced to free-riding by the deviants.
Abstaining from participation of ﬁnancing the public goods, those who visit
the illicit market exert a negative ﬁscal externality on the honest consumers.
The relation between moral sentiments and market behavior is of particular
interest also from the point of view of the interaction of buyers and sell-
ers. When market behavior reﬂects moral sentiments, the legal ﬁrms can
opportunistically price the self-esteem of honest people. From the opposite
perspective, the consumers in the legal market have the option of visiting
the illicit market. This results in an implicit blackmailing option, making
the honest consumers earn surplus over the price charged by the legal pro-
ducer.6
We report a number of results. We ﬁrst show how high tax rate, low
expected cost of punishment and low relative cost of production shape the
industry equilibrium leading to contraction of the legal sector and a boost in
the shadow economy. To qualify, rising tax rate tends to expand the shadow
economy through the tax avoidance eﬀect. There is an associated public
goods eﬀect, which accelerates or decelerates the expansion of the shadow
economy depending on the possibility of the legal ﬁrm to make proﬁtw h e n
the tax rate is changed under the requirement of balanced government bud-
get. Moral sentiments in terms of self-esteem and disapproval of deviations
from social norms operate as mechanisms which limit the shadow market
activities. The social disapproval eﬀect, however, tends to be diluted with
4The reasons for non-opportunistic behavior have been extensively discussed by biolo-
gists. Hamilton (1964) introduced the notion of kin selection and Trivers (1971) a more
general view of reciprocal altruism. Wilson (1975) represents a comprehensive document of
reciprocal behavior among animals extended to human behavior by Binmore (1998). Frank
(1988) argued convincingly that the ability of people to behave non-opportunistically serves
as a helpful commitment device facilitating beneﬁcial relations like joint ventures.
5Cf. Frank (1987) for a pioneering analysis of honesty and dishonesty.
6Our model highlights the conﬂict between opportunistic private incentives and col-
lective values and norms. Some studies in the sociological literature explain crimes as
an outcome of evolutionaly interplay between productive and expropriative staregies, cf.
Cohen and Machalek (1988) and Vila and Cohen (1993).
3expansion of shadow economy, providin gaf u r t h e rd r i v i n gf o r c ef o rf u r t h e r
shadow market transactions. Even though the moral case against shadow
economy is strong, shadow markets are not, however, completely bad. Ex-
istence of illicit markets gives rise to a number of conﬂicting welfare eﬀects.
Some of those are welfare enhancing. In particular, shadow markets threat
the pricing power of legal producers. In our approach, shadow markets inten-
sify competition between producers. The paper does not, of course, suggest
that it would be optimal to have a shadow economy in all industries or that
market mechanisms would result in an optimal shadow economy.7 In indus-
tries with intense competition, the social gains from shadow economy are
limited. Moreover, the paper suggests that the market solution can hardly
be expected to lead to an optimal shadow economy. This view arises from
the two externalities explored, ﬁscal externality and erosion of social capital.
In the market solution, the shadow economy results in a welfare loss arising
from underprovision of public goods. With shadow markets, moral standards
tend to become deteriorated. This is a mechanism which has properties of
built-in dynamics. There has also been a popular view that shadow markets
tend to operate as a disciplinary mechanism and control wasteful tax col-
lection. We prove that the Laﬀe rc u r v eh a sau n i q u em a x i m u m .W es h o w ,
however, that is not necessarily the case that shadow markets enhance wel-
fare by limiting wasteful tax collection. However, for the shadow economy
to exist in the social optimum along with the legal sector, it is necessary
that people’s moral sentiments do not punish illicit transactions too heavily.
Should the legal sector survive with people having incentives for tax evasion,
the tax rate cannot too high.
Our paper is structured as follows. After surveying the previous stud-
ies, we ﬁr s te x p l o r et h em a r k e ts o l u t i o na n dt h eﬁscal externality of tax
avoidance, and some welfare eﬀects in the absence of moral sentiments. We
introduce public goods. We then introduce moral norms in controlling illicit
transactions. Those norms include self-esteem and social punishment. We
next consider a Leviathan government’s ability to raise revenue when shadow
economy creates an option to avoid taxes. Some further welfare eﬀects are
examined in the last section. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Previous Studies
Shadow Economy and Payment Systems It goes without saying that
in a fully eﬃcient economy, there is no role for a shadow economy. It arises
7For example, informational asymmetries tend to render a shadow economy in medical
services ineﬃcient.
4exclusively from government intervention, i.e. regulation and taxation. Such
a policy intervention has side eﬀects. Many empirical studies referred be-
low show that the size of the shadow economy has been most dramatic in
the planned socialistic economies with maximum governmental intervention.
However, shadow sectors exist in market economies as well.
As early as in 1958, Cagan proposed that people prefer to use cash in
illegal economy, especially in black markets and for tax evasion. Since his
seminal paper, a great deal of attention has been devoted to evaluating the
magnitude of illegal use of cash. After technological progress with electronic
payment systems, use of currency became challenged by e-purse which, inter-
esting enough, seems to have failed. Cash has not disappeared. Consequently,
Hancock and Humphrey (1998) ask why cash - with a positive opportunity
cost - continues to be used for transactions when other assets earn positive
return. They conclude that factors other than the simple opportunity cost
must play primary role in determining holdings and the use of cash. After
an extensive survey Drehman et al. (2002) conclude that ’bad behavior’ cre-
ates a demand for anonymous means of payment. Anonymity provides an
important distinction between the characteristics of currency and e-money.
An important reason for holding cash would be the anonymity and the op-
portunity to visit illegal economy.8
Magnitude of Shadow Economy Some useful ﬁgures for understanding
the magnitude of illegal demand for cash are provided, for example, by Rogoﬀ
(1998). Accordingly, half of the currency holdings in the OECD countries
are in the domestic informal economy. Humphrey et al. (2000) suggest that
use of cash in illegal activities is about 67 percent of the total cash use in
Norway. Moreover, they predict that the share of cash used in illegal activ-
ities continues to rise up to 80 percent by 2005, as in legal use cash will be
substituted by other payment mediums. Concluding from these studies it
appears that informal economy already is the main holder of cash. In addi-
tion, the technological progress will further distort the demand as the share
of the legal use will decrease and the share of illegal use will increase. Thus
the authorities will face an unpleasant moral dilemma, as the seigniorage
revenues are likely to be due to providing the means of payment for illegal
activities, for example, tax evasion!
As it has been straightforward to marry use of cash and shadow economy,
it is no surprise that ﬁrst attempts to infer the size of the shadow economy use
8Drehman et al. (2002) propose that authorities might be able to decrease illegal eco-
nomic activities by making e-money a legal tender so that e-money could really challenge
the currency.
5cash data. For a review, we refer to Schneider and Enste (2002). Giles (1999)
s u g g e s t st h a tt h es i z eo ft h es h a d o we c o n o m yh a sb e e ng r o w i n go v e rt h ep a s t
two or three decades in almost all of the countries for which comparative
data have been assembled. According to Giles, growth in the underground
economy is associated with increases in the actual or perceived tax burden
but also with the degree of economic regulation. The view is shared by
Thomas (1999) who hints that a growing shadow economy may be an indi-
cation of over-taxation and over-regulation, a view which is shared by our
model. He also suggests that at least some part of the shadow economy may
be social security fraud, making unemployment less bad as it looks. Thus,
understanding the economic and social mechanisms in the shadow economy
may be much more important than perhaps often thought.
Links to Policy There are several conclusions that have been justiﬁed in
the light of the above results. Schneider (2000) gives a concerned note by
suggesting that under a growing (or substantial) shadow economy, policy is
b a s e do nm i s t a k e no ﬃcial indicators. In addition, he suggests that a growing
shadow economy attracts workers to work in shadow economy and to work
less in the oﬃcial economy. Giles and Caragata (1999) are concerned that
unpaid tax in hidden economy or loopholes allowing abusive avoidance in
the existing tax system create a deadweight loss on the economy. These will,
in turn, undermine taxation equity by shifting tax burden in the direction
of honest, socially responsible individuals and corporations. Further, they
suggest that growing hidden economy gives rise to an increasing segment of
the money supply which is uncontrolled. According to Giles and Caragata,
part of the hidden economy is learned response to changing opportunities
and constraints in ﬁscal policy, but on the other hand, there is a threshold
level of underground activity.
Theoretical work Theoretical attempts to analyze the shadow econ-
omy include Cowell (1989) who asks how far should taxation authorities
go in pursuit of the missing income. In a paper which is closest to ours,
Acemoglu (1994) analyzes the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of the
reward structure on the allocation of talent across diﬀerent activities with
divergent private and social returns. The non-pecuniary aspects of reward
structure consist of social status and prestige received for diﬀerent activities.
He presents the following channels via which the prestige and the status are
inﬂuenced. First, learning by new generations will start from the already es-
tablished norms and role models. Second, people often adjust their behavior
comparing themselves to a particular reference group. Thus, social status
6may depend on choices that the rest of the society makes and ’bad behavior’
may have less damaging stigma when it is more widespread. Third, individu-
als feel unhappy living in a highly ’immoral’ society while also knowing that
’bad behavior’ is bad. Lastly, Acemoglu also notes that the society may lack
the social or political will to change the status quo.
The determinants and eﬀects of the informal sector are studied in an
endogenous growth model by Loayza (1996). He assumes that the production
technology depends on congestable public services. Using data on Latin
American countries it is found that the informal sector negatively aﬀects
growth and its size depends on tax burden, labor-market restrictions and
government institutions. Johnson et al. (1997) consider allocation of labor
between the oﬃcial and the unoﬃcial sectors, its implications for tax revenue,
law and order, and eﬃciency. They suggest that supply of public goods tends
to result in increasing returns in private ﬁrms, leading to multiple equilibria.
Data on the economic transition of formerly communist countries suggests
that market-supporting institutions are critical for a successful transition.
Friedman et al. (2000) ask to what extent a ﬁrm should divert activity
to unoﬃcial economy. Using various data sets on Eastern Europe, Former
Sovjet Union, OECD and Latin America, they suggest that the incentive to
go underground to dodge higher tax rates is outweighed by the beneﬁts of
remaining oﬃcial.
Camera (2001) uses the Kiyotaki-Wright random matching model to an-
alyze what would happen if authorities promote the use of e-purse and limit
the use of currency. Individuals can engage in illegal and legal production and
perform monetary or intermediated cash-less transactions. The government
monitors imperfectly the monetary exchange process, whilst the government
monitors perfectly the intermediated exchange process. An equilibrium exists
with no illegal production if monitoring is suﬃciently extensive and money
supply is moderate. Transactions may be entirely cash-less when interme-
diation is suﬃciently inexpensive. When enforcement is not too extensive,
however, there are monetary equilibria where legal and illicit production co-
exist. Moreover, it is possible that an over-provision of currency may induce
larger participation in illegal production. Accordingly, the results provide a
rationale for limiting the amount of cash in circulation. Nonetheless, using
currency as an exogenous discipline on illicit undertakings may have unin-
tended consequences, such as depressing all trading activities and decreasing
welfare. Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein (2003) apply an intertemporal general
equilibrium model to explore the link between tax rates, access to credit and
the size of the underground economy. By assuming that ﬁrms can operate
partially in the formal and partially in the underground economy they de-
rive entry and exit into underground economy as part of optimizing behavior
7that depends on taxes and interest rates. Simulation results for Pakistan
demonstrate that entry into underground economy can have a cyclical na-
ture. Moreover, the share of underground activity will decline over time and
sectors gradually move back into legal economy. With low taxes, there is no
underground economy, but due to high budget and trade deﬁcit the low tax
regime is not sustainable over time. Thus an economy may have to accept
some underground activity as part of an otherwise acceptable tax program.
Davidson, Martin and Wilson (2003) suggest that shadow transactions
may increase welfare. They argue in the experience goods framework that
by allowing agents to self-select into the black market, the government can
target tax breaks to transactions involving low-quality goods.
3M o d e l
3.1 Market Solution Without Moral Sentiments: Fis-
cal Externality
We consider a shadow economy arising from tax avoidance by consumers.
Thereby, it reduces resources available for production of public goods. Our
research strategy is to analyze ﬁrst the industry equilibrium when one sector
is taxed and the other is not. Subsequently, we introduce moral standards
to examine in which way they control the development of shadow economy.
A n o n y m o u sV i s i t st oS h a d o wE c o n o m y We consider a market with a
product brand where a producer has market power in pricing. The product
is assumed to have some prestige value, determining the basic willingness to
pay.9 In such markets, the entry cost is non-trivial because of the nature
of the product or because of barriers to entry. The products are subject
t oac o m m o d i t yt a x ,τ>0. Because of the market power, the producer
is able to shift part of the tax to consumers. The two elements, pricing
power and the tax wedge in consumer price create an incentive for illicit
production. To avoid social punishment, consumers try to visit the illicit
market anonymously.10
9Alternatively, we could think of paternalistically regulated industries, like casinos,
state monopolies in liquor production etc.
10To clarify, when we talk about an illicit producer, this should not be understood to
refer a registered ﬁrm but to an activity which is rival to legal activity. We also notice that
we abstract from the possibility that the legal ﬁrm operates partly like an illicit producers
in the shadow economy. Though such an activity is common in practice, we leave it out if
only to keep the model simple enough.
8Consumers Consumers are assumed to have preferences over goods and
social approval. By their intrinsic preferences, people are assumed to be all
alike. They are egoists in the sense of utility maximizers. But they also care
for what other people think of them.11 Thus, they have subjective preference
both for their self-esteem and they care about the expected social punishment
of illegal actions.12 Thus, morality becomes a network phenomenon. However,
for tax avoidance reasons, it may become proﬁtable to deviate from the norm
of buying only legal products. By anonymous transactions, deviants try
to mimic the legal consumers, though risking themselves to social stigma.
Hiding deviations from an established social norm becomes attractive, as
hiding may help to maintain the status of an honest person.
In this section, we ﬁrst build the market model without moral sentiments.
We assume that consumers diﬀer with respect to their willingness to pay for
the prestige of the product brand. We assume that there is continuum of
consumers with mass one. They can buy a private product in the legal or
illicit market. We denote the producer prices by pl,p i. The marginal utility
from buying the private legal product, rk for consumer k, is assumed to be
uniformly distributed over [0,1]. Consumers also value public goods. We
assume that private goods and public goods are complementary and that
the valuation of public goods is uniform across consumers. Complementarity
implies that the marginal utility of a private good, x, for consumers is MUx =
g>0. Consumers visiting the illicit market are assumed to be caught with
probability ξ>0 and subject to penalty z>0. Consumers (k,j) visiting the
legal and illicit market thus are assumed to have net utilities
u
k = gr
k − (1 + τ)pl,v
j = gr
j − zξ − pi. (1)
Non-excludability implies that both honest and dishonest consumers de-
rive utility from public goods though the latter ones free-ride in the ﬁnancing
of those goods.13
In the industry equilibrium, we expect that there will be segmentation of
markets, i.e. those consumers with high marginal utility rk would buy the
legal product while those with lower marginal utility buy the illicit product.
11Such a subjective status eﬀect is well-known in psychology, cf. Singh-Manoux, Adler
and Marmot (2003). In biology, we refer to Ridley (1996). In economics, Fershtman, Weiss
and Hvide (2001) have studied status eﬀects.
12Binmore (1998) has shown that it is rational for people to commit to social norms
and social contracts as long as the commitment gains exceed the short-term losses from
deviating. Morality arises in the equilibrium of a repeated game as a social contract.
13The public good is more valable to a consumer with greater willingness to pay for the
private good.
9Denote the marginal consumers by (m,n) where m is indiﬀerent between
buying the legal and illicit product while n is indiﬀerent between buying the
illicit product and buying none. Thus the marginal utility for any consumer,
k, for buying the legal product is g(1 − k). The marginal utility for j for
buying the illicit product is g(1 − j) − ξz. Insert k = j = m to obtain the
expressions for the marginal consumer. For indiﬀerence, g(1−m)−(1+τ)pl =
g(1−m)−ξz−pi. Note that the market share of the legal production must
be xl = m.
The immediate observation is that the consumer price in the legal sector
has to exceed the price in the illicit sector, (1+τ)pl >p i. The price diﬀerential
is unaﬀected by the valuation of public goods. Solving for the expression
for the willingness to pay by the marginal consumer of the legal product
from condition
g−rm
xl = g, yields rm =( 1− xl)g. T os o l v ef o rt h em a r g i n a l
willingness to pay for the illicit product, we note that
g−rn
xi+xl = g, yielding
rn =( 1− xi − xl)g. Clearly, rm >r n. This implies that rm − (1 + τ)pl > 0.
By implication, the legal ﬁrm cannot exploit the full consumer surplus from
its customers. Such a market power of the legal consumer arises from that
she can "blackmail" the legal producer with her option to visit the illicit
market. The illegal producer, in contrast, is able to exploit the full surplus
from its marginal customer.
To summarize, rm >r n > 0. Then we know that all those customers with
a higher product valuation than the marginal customer m will buy the legal
product. The other active customers buy the illicit product. The third group
buys nothing.
Solving for the price diﬀerential
(1 + τ)pl − pi = ξz. (2)
What this condition suggests is that a consumer is indiﬀerent between
visiting the legal and illicit market if the risk of getting caught and penalized
is fully compensated by the price diﬀerential. For the marginal consumer n,
the net utility from buying the illicit product is zero, g(1−n)−ξz−pi =0 .
Noting that the n is the last buyer, i.e. n = xl + xi, her net utility is
(1 − xl − xi)g − ξz − pi =0 . Thus, the valuation of public goods raises the
price of the illicit product. Through the ﬁrst arbitrage condition, this is then
reﬂected in the price of the legal product, too.
The total production thus satisﬁes




10Solving for the prices
pi =( 1− xl − xi)g − zξ, pl =
(1 − xl − xi)g
1+τ
.
Proﬁts Market equilibrium can now be analyzed in terms of competition
with diﬀerentiated products. The legal ﬁrm can take opportunistically ad-
vantage of honest consumers. On the other hand, the illicit market intensiﬁes
competition. This results in fewer consumers in the legal market, exerting a
pressure on the legal price.14 Consumers buy the product with greater net




(pl − cl)xl, max
xi
( pi − ci)xi, (3)
where cl,c i > 0 are the production costs.16
Nash equilibrium In Nash equilibrium, market shares satisfy
xl =

















Lemma 1 The shadow market exists in the industry equilibrium if
xi =
g +( 1+τ)cl − 2zξ − 2ci
3g
> 0
14The ﬁrm producing in the legal market obviously has an incentive to capture the
consumers also in the illicit market. An example is the illegal production of pirate products
of cigarettes in Eastern European countries. The legal ﬁrm typically then issues licences
to combat the illegal pirate production.
15One can extend the analysis to quality uncertainty in the illicit market. One of the
recent examples is the Estonian vodka. When bought in illicit markets, it has killed some
consumers.
16The decision to become a producer in the illicit market could be analyzed in terms of
occupational choice. Such a choice would also be subject to moral considerations which,
however, will not be explicitly discussed in the current paper.
11High tax rate and low expected cost of punishment and low relative cost
of production support the development of shadow markets. In particular,
Lemma 2 Increased tax on the legal product shakes the industry equilibrium
leading to contraction of the legal sector and a boost in the shadow economy.
These natural conclusions are available from (4) and (5), ∂xl/∂τ = −2cl/3g<
0,∂x i/∂τ = cl/3g>0. When the tax rate is increased, it is natural that the
legal price declines, ∂pl/∂τ =( cl − 3pl)/3(1 + τ) < 0, and the price in the
shadow market increases, ∂pi/∂τ = cl/3 > 0.
However, when tax revenue is used to ﬁnance public goods, these natural
results no longer hold as their validity is limited to the ceteris paribus case.
The role of public goods in the determination of the limits to shadow economy



















Lemma 3 With large market shares (xl > 1
3,x i > 1
3), an increase in the
supply of public goods reduces both the size of the legal sector and the illicit
sector. It is only when the market shares are small that the complementarity
eﬀect of public and private goods raises output when more public goods become
available.
This somewhat surprising ﬁnding follows from the proﬁt maximizing be-
havior of producers. Realizing that the willingness to pay by consumers for
the private products has increased with more public goods available, produc-
e r sc a nr a i s et h e i rp r o ﬁts by actually cutting the production and charging
higher prices.
3.2 Balanced Budget Requirement
Suppose now that the public goods available are constrained by the tax rev-
enue generated by taxation of the legal product. This amounts to considering
the industry equilibrium subject to the constraint
g = τplxl. (9)
With a given tax rate, such a constraint endogenizes the supply of public
goods in the economy.17 We now have ﬁve equations to determine the ﬁve
17We consider below the case where the tax rate is determined by revenue maximizing
government.
12variables (xl,x i,p l,p i,g) in the industry equilibrium. Dishonest people un-
derstand that by free-riding in ﬁnancing the public goods production they
also suﬀer if the tax revenue is reduced and less public goods are available.
Does this understanding restrict the market share of the shadow economy?
What does the uncoordinated equilibrium look like?
Suppose that there is a marginal increase in the tax rate τ. What hap-
















We ﬁnd that if the tax rate is increased, there are two eﬀects. The ﬁrst one
deﬁnitively tends to make the shadow economy larger. This can be called the
tax avoidance eﬀect and its magnitude is measured by cl/3g. High production
cost in the legal sector makes the tax avoidance eﬀect large, while large
supply of public goods has a negative impact on the expansion of the shadow
economy. These eﬀects follow from production decisions by ﬁrms. There is
a secondary eﬀect which depends on the impact of tax rate on tax revenue
and hence on supply of public goods,
dg
dτ and on the initial market share of
the shadow economy, xi. It is appropriate to call this the public goods eﬀect.
Totally diﬀerentiating the budget constraint dg = dτ (plxl)+τ (dplxl + pldxl)























The denominator is always positive because 1
3
τ
(1+τ)xl < 1. The sign of
numerator is, however, ambiguous. Despite its sign,
1/3−xi
g is positive in
when shadow economy is small and negative when it is large. The public
goods eﬀect therefore generates accelerating or decelerating mechanisms on
the expansion of the shadow economy when the tax rate is increased. Those
mechanisms depend on the changed possibility of the legal ﬁrm to make
proﬁt when the tax rate is greater. Consider s small initial shadow economy.
A sharp decline in proﬁt plxl reduces access to public goods, slowing down
expansion of the shadow economy. A minor decline in proﬁt, however, makes
tax revenue and hence supply of public goods sustainable. Consumers can
move to the shadow economy with less concern of what happens to public
goods. When the shadow economy has reached more consumers, the sign
of (1/3 − xi) changes, the accelarating secondary eﬀect disappears and the
proﬁte ﬀect starts to decelerate. Despite such dynamic mechanisms, the
13economy settles down in an equilibrium with positive tax revenue and positive
supply of public goods as long as the proﬁto ft h el e g a lﬁrm, plxl, does not
vanish.
From a dynamic perspective, we have the following result
Proposition 4 Rising tax rate tends to expand the shadow economy through
the tax avoidance eﬀect. There is an associated public goods eﬀect under the
requirement of balanced budget, which accelerates or decelerates the expansion
of the shadow economy, depending on the possibility of the legal ﬁrm to sustain
proﬁtability when the tax rate is raised.
3.3 Some Welfare Eﬀects
Above we arrived at the market solution with a given tax rate, establishing
the condition for existence of the shadow economy in industry equilibrium.
It is natural to address the welfare gains and losses associated with the emer-
gence of the shadow economy.
The major welfare loss arises from redistribution of tax burden between
honest and dishonest consumers, i.e. the ﬁscal externality. It is not necessar-
ily the case that the tax burden of each honest consumer increases but they
deﬁnitively remain the sole contributors to production of public goods. This
t e n d st ol e a dt os o c i a ld i s a p p r o v a le ﬀect to be analyzed in the next section.
Moreover, with a given tax rate, the total tax revenue is reduced. This limits
the supply of public goods and reduces the well-being of all consumers, both
tax-payers and free-riders. Underprovision of public goods arises. Apart from
the ﬁscal externality, there is, however, a welfare gain to the extent that the
legal producer faces a more intensive competition in the market. These two
eﬀects are opposite, leaving us with the following conclusion
Proposition 5 In the market solution, the shadow economy results in a wel-
fare loss arising from underprovision of public goods; but there is also a wel-
fare gain arising from lower prices.
With a competitive market and with a limited initial pricing power of the
legal ﬁrm, it apparently is the welfare loss which dominates. With strong
pricing power of a brand producer in circumstances of rather inelastic de-
mand, it cannot be excluded that it may be the welfare gain which domi-
nates. Our next question is whether moral sentiments can help to control
the market share of illicit production and whether such a moral-based control
is socially desirable. It will turn out that, apart from the two mechanisms
studied above, the answer depends also on the view one takes on government
as tax collector.
143.4 Moral Norms in Control of Illicit Transactions
Morality as a Group Phenomenon We now introduce two mechanisms
to control illicit transactions. First, we introduce moral sentiments in the
values by consumers. Second, we introduce the cost of holding cash which
turns out to operate analogously to the tax on legal transactions.
In addition to their basic willingness to pay, consumers are now assumed
also to value self-esteem. Moreover, they are sensitive to social disapproval.
In other words, they care much of what they think of themselves and what the
other people think of them.18 The strength of self-esteem eﬀect is measured
by parameter s>0 and it is uniform across people. Only deviants are willing
to give it up.
The moral sentiments of, say poor and rich are thus equal and indepen-
dent of, their incomes. The total marginal utility of consumers buying a legal
product is then grk + s and is uniformly distributed over [s,g + s]. Alterna-
tively, consumers can anonymously visit the illicit market with catching-up
probability ξ. If caught, they suﬀer from social disapproval cost, z>0.
The model of the previous section is now extended in that the disapproval
is assumed to be expressed by those people who adhere to the social norm
of visiting the legal market only. The disapproval eﬀect thereby becomes a
group phenomenon, eroding with the contraction of the legal market.19 In
terms of consumer valuation, the legal product thus is valued at grk while
the illegal product is valued at grk − xl∆,w h e r e∆ is the expected social
punishment, ∆ = E[P] with
P =
½
z with probability ξ
0 with probability 1 − ξ.
We consider fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium. We assume further that
payments in the illicit market are made by cash. More eﬃcient means of
payments dominate in the legal market. There is thus an extra cost of making
payments in the illicit market in terms of the cost of holding cash. The cost
diﬀerential is denoted by γ>0.It would be possible to interpret the model as
a cash-in-advance variety with pi measuring the amount of cash demanded.
Consumers visiting the legal and illicit markets then have net utilities,
u
k = gr
k + s − (1 + τ)pl,v
j = gr
j − xlzξ − (1 + γ)pi. (11)
18Existence of moral sentiments has been well-known in economics ever since Adam
Smith (1966) and studied more recently by Frank (1987, 1988). The origin of those
sentiments has been traced both to genetic forces in evolutionary biology or to memes,
cultural genes, cf. Dawkins (1976).
19There is no particular need to introduce any restriction on whether it is the self-esteem
or the social disapproval which has greater weight in people’s valuation. The model allows
for both cases.
15In our model, the mass of people will be endogenously distributed into
moral and immoral ones in terms of their behavior. In equilibrium people
thus diﬀer by their factual behavior. Moral (honest) and immoral (dishonest)
behavior is endogenously determined and so is the strength of the social
disapproval eﬀect xlzξ. Morality as social capital is thus determined by the
moral network, the expected relative size of the group of people expressing
social disapproval in case of detection. The deviants20 a r ev i e w e da st h o s e
taking the risk of being subject to stigma.21
Denote again the marginal consumers by (m,n) where m is indiﬀerent
between buying the legal and illicit product while n is indiﬀerent between
buying the illicit product and buying none. Thus the marginal utility for any
consumer, say k, for buying the legal product is g(1−k). Then the marginal
utility for j for buying the illicit product is g(1−j)−ξzxl. For the marginal
consumer, her net marginal utilities have to be equal g(1−m)+s−(1+τ)pl =
g(1 − m) − ξzxl − (1 + γ)pi.
The price diﬀerential now satisﬁes (1+τ)pl −(1+γ)pi = s+ξzxl. Thus,
both the self-esteem eﬀe c ta n dt h eg r o u pe ﬀect of moral sentiments are re-
ﬂe c t e di nt h ep r i c ed i ﬀerential, as the legal producer can exploit them. For
the marginal consumer n, the net utility from buying the illicit product is
zero, (1−n)g −ξzxl −(1+γ)pi =0 . Noting that the n is the last buyer, i.e.
n = xl +xi, her net utility is (1−xl −xi)g −ξzxl −(1+γ)pi =0 . The total
production thus satisﬁes xl + xi = g − ξzxl − (1 + γ)pi.
Solving for the prices
pi =
(1 − xl − xi)g − xlzξ
(1 + γ)
,p l =
(1 − xl − xi)g + s
(1 + τ)
.
Nash equilibrium With reaction functions of the full model
xl =
g + s − (1 + τ)cl − xi
2
,x i =
g − (1 + zξ)xl − (1 + γ)ci
2
,
20The deviants might value positively other deviants, like members in gangs of sub-
cultures. It would be easy to extend the model in this direction but for simplicity, we
abstract from it.
21The stigma eﬀect has previously been discussed in psychology by Puhl and Brownell
(2003) or Schulze and Angermeyer (2003).
16it is standard to solve for the Nash equilibrium
xl =












(g − zξ)(g +( 1+γ)ci) − (g + zξ)(s − (1 + τ)cl)
(3g − zξ)(1+γ)
(15)
We comment on equilibrium below.
3.5 Competition under Morality
Comparative Statics We ﬁrst develop technically the comparative static
eﬀects. Their algebra is subject to condition g −ξz > 0. This condition only
states the natural requirement that the expected cost of punishment cannot
be greater than the maximal willingness to pay. Then, the equilibrium is
characterized by the following comparative static results
T a b l e1C o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c s








These results are to be discussed below.
Self-Esteem as Conscience and Social Punishment Comparative
static analysis shows the potentially powerful eﬀects of self-esteem and the
risk of being caught when deviating and being punished. Those eﬀects tend
to maintain the legal sector large. Evaluating we ﬁnd ∂xl/∂s = 2
3g−zξ. This
is positive as 3g − ξz > 0. Self-esteem operates like a conscience for an
individual, supporting the legal production. The mechanism that the social




17The price eﬀects are non-trivial. This results from that the self-esteem
and social disapproval eﬀects tend to be priced not only in the illicit product.
Their eﬀect also spills over to the legal market. It is easy to see that the
net surplus of the marginal consumer in the legal market is lower when he
is subject to self-esteem. Insert the expressions for the quantity and price
from above in the surplus of the marginal consumer, g(1 − m)+s − (1 +
τ)pl and develop the partial derivative with respect to s. This suggests that
with consumers becoming more moral, they pay a price in terms of reduced
surplus. The marginal consumer is now the one who previously was a shadow
market visitor. They keep the option of returning to the shadow market. It
is easy to see that the greater is the shadow market, the more valuable is
this option. Pricing of the shadow market producer, however, reduces this
option value.
There is also a self-reinforcing mechanism in the expansion of the shadow
economy. To see this, consider two industry equilibria with diﬀerent social
punishment rates, zL <z H. From above, we ﬁnd that in the former case the
industry equilibrium is characterized by a greater shadow economy than in
the latter case. Thus, when starting with the same initial equilibrium, the
expansion of shadow market is in the former case greater than in the latter
case. This eﬀect arises from the self-reinforcing element of the diminishing
group eﬀect, i.e. erosion of social norms with the expansion of the shadow
economy. Even without such a deterioration, the former industry would
settle down in larger shadow sector than the latter industry. The group
eﬀect makes the industry structure even more diﬀerentiated.22
We conclude
Proposition 6 Moral sentiments in terms of self-esteem and disapproval of
deviations from social norms operate as mechanisms which limit the shadow
market activities. The social disapproval eﬀect, however, tends to be diluted
with expansion of shadow economy, providing a further driving force for fur-
ther shadow market transactions.
Shadow economies arise from tax avoidance. It is of interest to notice
that the cost of holding money operates very much like a commodity tax in
our model. To see this, solve for the proﬁts





22Despite that the equilibrium outcome is characterized by stratiﬁcation of consumers,
the shadow markets do not perform a screening function of people between "honest" and
"dishonest" in our model, as all consumers are ex ante identical in terms their preferences
for moral sentiments.





Thus, the tax rate and the cost of holding cash have a systematic impact
on the proﬁts of the two producers. Even with uniform cost of transactions,
we have
Proposition 7 Under the norm that legal transactions give rise to self-
esteem, the legal output tends to exceed the illicit one.
Proof. In the case of duopoly with s = z =0and having uniform cost of
transactions across means of payment, τ = γ, ﬁrms are symmetric and share
markets on an equal basis. In the current model, positive self-esteem raises
t h ed e m a n di nt h el e g a lm a r k e t ,w h i l ei tr e d u c e st h ed e m a n di nt h ei l l e g a l
sector.
This result of course continues to hold when τ<γb u ti tn e e dn o th o l di f
τ>γ .We also point out that the result need not hold in an economy where
it is commonplace to avoid taxes and where the self-esteem is not shaked by
visits to shadow markets.
4 Shadow Economy and Leviathan Govern-
ment
4.1 Laﬀer Curve
The proponents of the view of government as revenue-maximizing Leviathan
which uses resources ineﬃciently obviously welcome the shadow economy.23
This section studies the eﬀects of illicit transactions on an economy’s Laﬀer-
curve. Suppose that the tax revenue, T, is only partly allocated to public
goods and that the government is able to extract a fraction, say 0 <y<1
for its own use. Then the resources available for ﬁnancing public goods are
g =( 1− y)T.
Assume that the government chooses the tax rate τ to maximize its tax
r e v e n u ec o l l e c t e df r o mt h es a l e so ft h el e g a lﬁrm, T = τplxl. We notice that
such a government proﬁle, though a burden on tax paying honest consumers,
23Waste of tax revenue may result, for example, from inﬂuence or bribes by powerful
lobbies leading to ineﬃcient public spending. Grossman (2002) shows that if the technology
of predation is suﬃciently eﬀe c t i v ei nas o c i e t y ,t h e nh a v i n ga" k i n g "i sb e t t e rf o re v e r y o n e
even though the king maximizes the consumption of a ruling elite.
19is not necessarily detrimental to public goods production as an increase in
tax revenue means also an increase in the supply of public goods. What
m a t t e r si st h em a g n i t u d eo ft h ef r a c t i o n ,y, which the government extracts.
We assume that y is constant. Then maximization of (1 − y)T is equivalent
to maximizing T.
Inserting the legal price and quantity yields
T(τ,s,z,ξ)=
τ




((g +2 s +( 1+γ)ci)g +( g − zξ)(1+τ)cl)(2s + g +( 1+γ)ci − 2(1+τ)cl).
The self-esteem and social disapproval eﬀects thus interfere with the
Leviathan government’s ability to raise tax revenue. The revenue T(τ,s,z,ξ)
is a product of two terms. It is zero when any of those terms is zero, non-zero
otherwise. The ﬁrst of those terms is τ
(1+τ)(3g−zξ)2 which is zero when the tax
rate is zero. The second one P(τ) is a polynomial of second degree in the
tax rate. It has two roots. Recalling that g − zξ > 0, the coeﬃcient of τ2 is
−2(g − zξ)(cl)
2 < 0,
making P(τ) a downward-sloping parable. It has two real roots. Thus, the
three roots of T(τ,s,z,ξ)=0are
τ1 =0
τ2 = −
(g +2 s +( 1+γ)ci)g + cl (g − zξ)
cl (g − zξ)
< 0 (17)
τ3 =
g +2 s − 2cl + ci (γ +1 )
2cl
> 0
The positivity of τ3 follows from that g +2s−2cl +ci (γ +1 )is less than
the numerator of xl which has been recognized to be positive.
Excluding the negative tax rate, we ﬁrst prove
Lemma 8 With low (positive) tax rates, tax revenue (Laﬀer curve) is in-
creasing in the tax rate.
Proof. Evaluating the slope of the tax revenue function at origin, we
obtain (∂T/∂τ)τ=0 = plxl +τ[xl(∂pl/∂τ)+pl(∂xl/∂τ)]. With an active legal
market, plxl > 0 while with τ =0 , t h el a s tt e r mi sz e r o .T h er e s u l tf o l l o w s
then by continuity.
Thus, the Laﬀer curve is increasing in the tax rate when the tax rate is




Figure 1: Laﬀer curve
Lemma 9 The legal sector disappears at tax rate τ3.
Proof. Inserting the solution τ3 into the expression for xl, one ﬁnds that
xl =0 .
It follows from these two Lemmas that there is unique tax rate tax, say
0 <τ ∗ <τ 3, at which tax revenue has the global maximum.
Proposition 10 The Laﬀer curve has a unique maximum.
We note that from above, the optimal tax rate τ∗ is close to τ3/2 but
marginally below it because the revenue τ
(1+τ)(3g−zξ)2P(τ) is not a perfectly
symmetric parable. As τ3 positively depends on public goods, self-esteem,
the cost of legal production, the cost of holding money and negatively on the
cost of legal production, so does presumably the tax rate τ∗.
4.2 Shadow Markets and Tax Revenue
The intuition suggests that having an untaxed sector reduces the resources
which the government can extract from consumers. Whether this is socially
desirable is another matter and depends on to what extent people value pub-
lic goods. Moreover, when moral sentiments become important, consumers
do not necessarily switch from the taxed sector to the untaxed sector, re-
laxing the eﬀective constraint on revenue maximizing behavior. It is harder
21to predict what the revenue maximizing tax rates are. The government is
interested in the tax revenue only.
Let us contrast the cases of one producer and two producers. With
one producer, the marginal consumer, say consumer m, is indiﬀerent be-
tween buying and not buying when the price is pM =( rm + s)/(1 + τ).
The willingness to pay can be solved from the condition
g−rm
xM = g. Thus,
rm =( 1− xM)g. Maximizing the monopoly proﬁtg i v e s ,
xM =










g + s + cM(1 + τ)
2(1 + τ)
. (19)













The proﬁt for a legal producer in duopoly is (pl − cl)xl = 1
(1+τ) (xl)
2 .
Under natural conditions, xl <x M as in duopoly, market is shared by two
producers. Moreover, pl <p M. This means that the tax base in smaller
in duopoly than in monopoly. The same holds for tax revenue. Untaxed
sector reduces the resources which the Leviathan-government can extract
from consumers.
Compare next tax revenues with consumers having moral sentiments and





∂s pl] > 0. Similarly,
∂T








∂z > 0. What
this means is that formation of moral sentiments leads to an increase in the
tax base.
5 Further Notes on Welfare Eﬀects
Our model above left us with the conclusion that a shadow economy gives
rise not only to welfare losses but also to welfare gains. There is more to be
said. Once the government has selﬁsh Leviathan motives for grasping part of
the tax revenue, such eﬀorts should be controlled. Shadow markets discipline
government spending. They might lead to further welfare gains apart from
their role in controlling pricing and monopoly proﬁts. The ﬁscal externality
on tax-payers arising from free-riding in the ﬁnancing of public goods remains
on the cost side. People’s moral attitudes tend to control those who resort
to shadow markets. With a small shadow economy, the social punishment
22of deviants is severe. With an expanded shadow economy, the punishment
is diluted. The private beneﬁt to those obeying social norms is reﬂected in
self-esteem but is priced by the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm. The incidence of
moral standards is hence split between the honest consumers and the legal
ﬁrm.
As there are both welfare gains and losses, it is far from trivial to suggest
w h a tt h e" w e l f a r eo p t i m u m "m i g h tb e ,a si tw o u l dd e p e n do nn u m b e ro f
mechanisms. As it appears that shadow economies perform also a positive
function in an economy, we explore the issue by a formal discussion.
Fixed supply of public goods Consider an economy with inherited in-
frastructure, i.e. assume ﬁxed supply of public goods. Introduce g =1 .
Formally, the utilitarian view would explore the maximal aggregated con-
sumer and producer surplus W = CSl+CSi+πl+πi subject to the relevant
constraints.24 Here CSl and CSi denote the after-tax expressions for the




L = W + λlxl + λixi + λOxO (20)
+µ[1 − xl − xi − xO],
where xO is the number of consumers who do not buy and where λi ≥ 0,µ≥ 0
are the relevant shadow prices. It is immediately clear that the solution
to this problem clearly deviates from the market solution because of the
externalities involved.
To develop an intuition, consider ﬁrst the case in the absence of moral
sentiments and assume that the cost of production is nil, cl = ci =0 . It is then
easy to see that in the market equilibrium, a commodity tax on the legal good
operates like a lump-sum tax, borne by the shareholders of the legal ﬁrm.
The legal price fully accommodates the tax and production eﬃciency holds in
the market (Nash) equilibrium. The tax eﬀects are limited to income eﬀects,
with the tax falling on the legal ﬁrm’s owners. In the absence of production
cost, the optimal proﬁts is low and deviates from zero only to the extent
t h ec o s to fb e i n gc a u g h ti nt h es h a d o wm a r k e tm a k e st h el e g a lp r o d u c e r
charge a positive price. Optimal allocation of consumers into the legal and
shadow economy would capture the idea that the marginal utility of the last
legal consumer would equal the marginal utility of the ﬁrst consumer in the
shadow market. The cost of being caught and the tax rate would be the
decisive determinants of the optimal allocation. With ﬁxed supply of public
24The welfare eﬀect of imperfect competition per se is not discussed.
23goods, it would be socially desirable to eliminate the wasteful tax collection
and allocate the whole production to the shadow economy. All consumers
would consume the product.
With cl > 0,c i > 0, however, the desired allocation would be diﬀerent.
The price of the legal product would have to be higher as the price in the
shadow market would have be positive. Positive tax revenue would be gen-
erated. With cl > 0, t h ec o m m o d i t yt a xw o u l dn o tb ef u l l yb o r n eb yt h e
shareholders becoming distortive and reducing the optimal production of the
legal ﬁrm and hence resulting in a welfare loss. The shadow economy would
clearly remain large in the welfare optimum also of such an economy.
Moral Sentiments and Welfare The size of the shadow economy, how-
ever, will be controlled if people are subject to moral sentiments. The pre-
diction is that this makes the legal production greater. However, neither in
this case is the ﬁrst-best attainable in the market because of the externalities
involved. With expressions for consumer and producer surplus developed in
Appendix A, the social ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior solution can be
derived as
xi = ϕo − ϕ1xl,x l = φ0 − φ1xi, (21)
where
ϕo =




(1 + zξ)(1+τ) − τ (1 + γ)
(1 + τ)(1− γ)
¶
φ0 =




τ (γ +1 )− (1 + zξ)(1+τ)
−(1 − τ)(γ +1 )
¶
.
We notice that xl = φ0 is the socially optimal output if only one ﬁrm produces
(see Appendix A for derivation with g =1and λg =0 ). The second term in
the expression for xl thus states the eﬀect of the illicit competitor.
To qualify for an interior optimum, the market shares have to fall within
(0,1). Moreover, their sum must also fall within (0,1). Finally, the lines (21)
must cross within the triangle, cf. Figure 2. Formally, the conditions are (i)
0 <x l,x i < 1,(ii)0<x l + xi < 1,(iii) ϕ1 6= 1
φ1.
In terms of 0 <ϕ o < 1 and 0 <φ o < 1,conditions (i) give
0 <
1+s − (1 + τ)cl
(1 − τ)
< 1, 0 <
1 − (1 + γ)ci
1 − γ
< 1.




















24Therefore, for the legal sector to survive, tax rate should not be too high.
For the shadow economy to have a chance, the cost of holding cash should
not be inﬂated too much.
What condition (ii) means is that when xi → 0, then ϕo/ϕ1 < 1, and
when xl → 0, then φo/φ1 < 1. Condition (iii) requires that the lines cross.
This is equivalent to,
if
1+s − (1 + τ)cl
(1 − τ)
> (<)
(1 + τ)(1− (1 + γ)ci)
(1 + zξ)(1+τ) − τ (1 + γ)
then
1 − (1 + γ)ci
1 − γ
> (<)
(1 + γ)(1+s − (1 + τ)cl)
(1 + zξ)(1+τ) − τ (1 + γ)
Consider these requirements in terms of moral sentiments. We notice that the
roles of self-esteem and social disapproval are interrelated. We show that the









(1+zξ)(1+τ)−τ(1+γ) implies that the for the shadow economy to
survive as part of social optimum, the self-esteem cannot yet be too great,
i.e. there is an upper limit for the magnitude of s.A l t e r n a t i v e l y , f o r t h e
legal sector to survive, the expected punishment zξ cannot be too small. We
thus see that people’s values in terms of moral sentiments will signiﬁcantly
interact with the desirability or undesirability of shadow markets. On the
other hand, if people lack from self-esteem, s =0 , and it is the latter case
which becomes relevant. Then for the legal sector to survive, the cost of
punishment for deviation zξ should not too large. As this tends to lead to
strong shadow economy, it is logically incompatible and can be excluded.
Collecting the ﬁndings,
Proposition 11 For the shadow economy to exist in the social optimum
along with the legal sector, it is necessary that people’s moral sentiments do
not punish illicit transactions too heavily. Should the legal sector survive with
people having incentives for tax evasion, the tax rate cannot too high.
In terms of Figure 2 in Appendix B, the equilibrium has to be located in
the lower part of the unit square below the 45◦ line, say at point E.
5.1 Wasteful Tax Collection
One should not only pay attention to people’s moral sentiments in the so-
cial ﬁrst-order conditions, but also to the possibility to ﬁnance public goods,
threatened by shadow markets. The task would again be to identify the mar-
ginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between the legal and illicit consumption
25subject to the additional condition that his valuation of the public good co-
incides with how much he has to pay for public goods. To ﬁxi d e a s ,r e t u r nt o
the assumption that the share that the tax collector can waste tax revenue is
given by 0 <y<1. Public goods available then have to satisfy g =( 1−y)T.
Denote by λg the relevant shadow price. The conditions which must hold in
the second-best social optimum are
Wxl − λg(1 − y)Txl =0
Wxi − λg(1 − y)Txi =0
Wg + λg[1 − (1 − y)Tg]=0
g − (1 − y)T =0 .
We have developed the expressions for the consumer surplus in Appendix
A. Depending both on the tax rate and the moral sentiments, the social
optimum can be a corner solution or an interior solution. An interior solution
is again characterized by λl = λi = λO = µ =0 . When the shadow economy
exists in the social optimum, it must hold that the net marginal social utility
from keeping the marginal consumer in the legal sector coincides with the
marginal social cost in terms of the tax liability. In the internal optimum,
Wxl/Txl = Wxi/Txi. In Appendix A, we derive the social ﬁrst-order conditions
in terms of (xl,x i,λ g,g). It is not possible to solve them explicitly because the
public goods, g, ought to be solved from a second-order equation. Therefore,
we resort to characterization of the optimum.
The intuition suggests that there is a case for allocating people to the
shadow economy to limit wasteful tax collection. However, the target of ﬁ-
nancing public goods requires an opposite action and necessitates a smaller
shadow economy. To take a position with respect to these conﬂicting targets
necessitates a study of how the government’s share y really is determined.
This is an empirical matter. We observe from the social ﬁrst-order condi-
tions, however, that an increase in the social shadow price of tax revenue λg
d o e sn o tn e e dt ol e a dt oc o n t r a c t i o no ft h es h a d o wm a r k e ti nt h ew e l f a r eo p -
timum. This is unexpected. The model is consistent both with an expansion
and contraction. The outcome depends on the magnitudes of the parame-
ters of the model. This conclusion challenges the view that shadow markets
necessarily are welfare-enhancing in their ability to limit wasteful tax collec-
tion. The reason for ambiguity is that the tax collector only extracts part of
the tax revenue, while the rest is used to satisfy people’s demand for public
goods.
Proposition 12 It is not necessarily the case that shadow markets enhance
welfare by limiting wasteful tax collection.
26One way to look into this issue is to note that wasteful tax collection
operates much like the ﬁscal externality caused by consumers in the illicit
market. Again, tax-paying consumers lose as they are the sole bearers of the
burden of ﬁnancing public goods while all have access to these goods.
Lemma 13 Increased wasteful tax collection operates like the ﬁscal external-
ity of an increase in the number of non-tax paying consumers.
Optimal Tax Having shaken the argument that the shadow economy is
good to have to control wasteful tax collection, we shake another argument.
i.e. why it should not exist. Consider once more an economy with zero
production cost cl = ci =0 . This is often the case with many high-tech digital
products. As we have stated, a commodity tax on the legal product operates
like an income levy on the shareholders of the legal ﬁrm. For maximal supply
of public goods, it it then optimal to maximize the tax revenue available from
the consumers of the legal ﬁrm. It falls on the ﬁrm’s owners. Even this result
does not imply that a shadow economy should not exist. The reason is that
competition resulting from having the shadow market reduces the legal price,
resulting in a welfare gain. Thus,
Proposition 14 In the case of products with zero cost of production, the
social planner ought to behave like the Leviathan, maximizing the tax rev-
enue from legal consumers but should not necessarily eliminate the shadow
economy.
6F i n a l R e m a r k s
We have studied industrial structure when consumers can visit either legal
or illicit markets. Contrary to ex ante beliefs, entry of an illegal economic
does not necessarily decrease welfare. The welfare gain is obvious as the
legal ﬁrm is not able to exploit the full consumer surplus. However, the
mechanisms are many. When people’s market behavior also reﬂects their
moral sentiments, the legal ﬁrm can price the self-esteem of honest people.
On the other hand, the buyers in the legal market have the option of visiting
the illicit market. Such an implicit blackmailing option makes them earn
surplus over the price charged by the legal producer. Those who visit the
illicit market beneﬁt from untaxed products, though they subject themselves
to moral disapproval. Untaxed products tend also to attract new buyers.
The paper has implications for monetary economics. Ever since Keynes
(1936), work on monetary economics has identiﬁed the various motives for
27why people hold cash in terms of transactions, precautionary and specula-
tive needs. The current paper has explored the microeconomics of a fourth
motive, the value of holding cash for anonymous transactions in a shadow
economy. Our theorizing leads to a number of new testable implications, not
yet analyzed in the monetary economics. By implication and in particular,
demand for money depends not only on illegal activities in the economy and
on the size of the shadow sectors but also on social norms and morality of
people, and the resulting social capital. In addition, it depends on the crime
rates, probability of being caught and the resulting punishment from illegal
activities. It also depends on the competitiveness and hence excess proﬁts
of the legal system and the general level of taxation, and on the industrial
structure with industries prone to develop shadow transactions.
A Expressions for consumer surplus













































2 +( pl − cl)xl +( pi − ci)xi. (A3)
where the prices can be inserted from the consumer indiﬀerence conditions.
If only one ﬁrm produces the welfare is




2 +( pM − cM)xM, (A4)












28When public goods are optimized, the social ﬁrst-order conditions must
acknowledge the link between the tax revenue and public goods. Social wel-
fare is linear in g for the reason that consumer surplus and proﬁts (through
the prices) are linear in g. Maximizing W + λg[g − (1 − y)T] with respect
to (xl,x i,g) gives A5 − A7. Then substituting in A8, gives an equation for
optimal g. It is a second-order equation.
xl =
(1 − (1 − y)τλg)(g + s) − (1 + τ)cl










− (1 + γ)τ (1 + (1 − y)λg)



















(1 + τ)(xl + xi)





2((1 + τ) − (1 − y)τxl (1 − xi − xl))
(A7)
g =( 1 − y)T (A8)
B Optimal industrial structure with shadow
economy
The equilibrium outcome is illustrated in Figure 2. The horizontal and ver-
tical lines at xl =1and xi =1 , represent the unit square. The diagonal line,
that bisects the unit square, represents the 45◦ -line with xi+xl ≤ 1. The opti-
mal outcome must be located below this line. Candidate lines xi = ϕo−ϕ1xl,
xl = φ0−φ1xi which satisfy this constraint, are illustrated by a pair of declin-
ing lines like R1 and R2 or R3 and R4 that pass through point E. However,
as they must satisfy the constraints φ0 < 1 and ϕ0 < 1,l i n e sR3 and R4












Figure 2: Optimal industrial structure with shadow economy
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